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agency costs. Managerial ﬁrm basedwealth delta has a signiﬁcant, negative effect on agency costs for ﬁrms in all
size categories. The signiﬁcance ofmanagerialﬁrmbasedwealth vega in reducing agency costs is concentrated in
small ﬁrms, suggesting that vega exposure is more effective where risk is higher. The signiﬁcance of cash com-
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pensation reduces agency costs by allowing risk-averse managers the opportunity to diversify outside the ﬁrm.
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This study provides evidence that well structured compensation
based incentives signiﬁcantly reduce investment related agency costs.
The potential conﬂict of interest between shareholders and professional
managers in large publicly traded corporations is a major issue in the
study of corporate governance. Rooted in the separation of power
between the shareholders that own the ﬁrm and the managers that
control the ﬁrm's assets, this well known agency conﬂict arises from
fundamental differences in the positions of shareholders andmanagers.
Whereas shareholders are in a position to readily diversify their wealth,
managers typically have most of their human capital tied up in the ﬁrm
and often hold a large proportion of their ﬁnancial wealth within the
ﬁrm as well (Fama, 1980; Stulz & Smith, 1985). This principal-agent
conﬂict gives rise to agency costs that lead to the sub-optimal use of a
ﬁrm's resources. Under-diversiﬁed, risk-averse managers have an in-
centive to reduce their personal exposure by undertaking investments
that reduce ﬁrm risk or by foregoing risky positive net present value
projects at the expense of shareholders in the form of reduced wealth
creation. As Jensen (1986) has noted, this problem is likely to be acute
in ﬁrms with low growth opportunities and high free cash ﬂow.ent, Bedford, United Kingdom.
. Belghitar), e.clark@mdx.ac.uk
. This is an open access article underThe conventional remedy for this conﬂict is to align managerial inter-
ests with those of shareholders by tying the manager's compensation to
ﬁrm value or ﬁrm performance (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Option
based compensation is well suited to this end because the convex
payout proﬁle of stock options can offset the concavity in the manager's
utility function. In practice, the use of option based compensation has
been increasingly employed since the latter part of the twentieth century
(Brockman, Martin, & Unlu, 2010; Murphy, 1999). For example, Murphy
(1999) observes that stock options have become the largest single com-
ponent of compensation over the last ﬁfteen years and Hall and Murphy
(2002) note that stock options constitute the single largest part of the
compensation packages of US CEOs. Similarly, Conyon, Core, and Guay
(2011) ﬁnd that during the period 1997–2003 the importance of salaries
in total compensation has declined forUKCEOs,while bonuses and equity
related pay, such as options have becomemore important. As discussed in
the following section, there is a long and growing literature examining
the determinants and incentive effects of managerial compensation on
agency costs. Surprisingly, despite this and the growing use of stock and
stock option compensation, there has been no attempt in the literature
to measure investment related agency costs directly and test if and how
they are impacted by option based compensation incentives.
This paper addresses this gap by ﬁrst explicitly measuring the in-
vestment related agency costs on a broad sample of UK ﬁrms, and
then assessing if and how managerial compensation based incentives
affect them. A UK sample is of particular interest because prior UKthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Table 1
Variable empirical deﬁnition and data sources.
Variables Empirical deﬁnition Source
CEO Delta CEO Delta is the pound change in CEO ﬁrm based
wealth⁎ for a 1% change in stock price, in thousands.
* CEO ﬁrm based wealth includes all equity holdings
(share ownership), unexpired stock and LTIPs options
accumulated and held by the CEO to date (£, thousands).
Boardex
CEO Vega CEO Vega is the pound change in the CEO's ﬁrm based
wealth⁎ for a 1% change in stock return standard
deviation, in thousands.
Boardex
CEO Cash The sum of all cash based compensation received by the
CEO during the year (salary, bonus, pension, and other).
Boardex
FCF Operating income before depreciation minus the sum
of taxes, interest expenses and dividends paid,
standardized by total assets.
Worldscope
MKTBV The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book
value of equity plus the market value of equity to the
book value of total assets
Worldscope
Q_Ratio The ratio of market capitalization plus total debt divided
by total assets.
Worldscope
MCAP The ratio of market capitalization to total assets Worldscope
Audit fees The natural logarithm of audit fees for the ﬁscal year Worldscope
Bsize The natural logarithm of total directors on the board.
Bindep is the ratio of total independent directors on the
board to total directors on the board
Boardex
Bindep Bindep is the ratio of total independent directors on the
board to total directors on the board
Boardex
LEV The ratio of long-term total debt to total assets. Worldscope
Fsize The natural logarithm of total assets Worldscope
DIV The ratio of total cash dividends paid to total assets Worldscope
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ing mechanisms, such as board structure, are not effective in reducing
agency costs (e.g. Goergen & Renneboog, 2001). In the absence of effec-
tive internal monitoring mechanisms, compensation based incentives
offer themselves as a credible alternative. They have the potential to
mitigate suboptimalmanagerial behaviour and, hence, to reduce agency
costs. To test this argument, we employ two analytical parameters of
option-based compensation risk-taking incentives, namely delta and
vega. Delta measures the sensitivity of themanager's ﬁrm based wealth
to the ﬁrm's stock price while vega captures the manager's ﬁrm based
wealth sensitivity to the ﬁrm's stock return volatility.1
Another important feature of this paper is that it recognizes that ﬁrm
size can affect the effectiveness of compensation incentives onmanage-
rial behaviour. It is generally held that due to greater complexity and
difﬁculty in monitoring, managerial actions are less observable in large
ﬁrms (Doukas, McKnight, & Pantzalis, 2005; McKnight & Weir, 2009).
Where managerial actions are less observable, managers could utilize
this cover to pursue conservative corporate policies at the expense of
shareholders. In this kind of environment compensation based incen-
tives could be very effective in mitigating the agency conﬂict. Managers
in small ﬁrms do not have this cover, but the agency conﬂict is exacer-
bated by the ﬁnancial vulnerability of small ﬁrms due to their limited
access to human and ﬁnancial resources (e.g. Titman & Wessels,
1988). Thus, if larger ﬁrms are conducive to coveringmanagerial actions
and smaller ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially fragile, the effect of compensa-
tion incentives may vary across the large-small environment.
In themain contribution of this paper the results show thatmanage-
rial compensation incentives do have a signiﬁcant effect on investment
related agency costs, and that the effects do vary with respect to ﬁrm
size. Managerial wealth delta is signiﬁcantly, negatively related to agen-
cy costs for both large and small ﬁrms. This suggests that managerial
compensation packages with high sensitivity to the ﬁrm stock price
reduce agency costs. The results also show that cash compensation is
signiﬁcantly, negatively related to agency costs for large ﬁrms but not
small ones. This is consistent with Guay's (1999) argument that higher
cash compensation reduces agency costs by affording risk-averse
managers in large ﬁrms the opportunity to diversify outside the ﬁrm.
Finally, managerial wealth vega signiﬁcantly reduces agency costs in
small ﬁrms but not in large ones, suggesting that vega exposure is
more effective where risk is higher.2. Previous related work
Jensen (1986) argues that ﬁrms with free cash ﬂow and low growth
prospects are prone to agency costs. Within the free cash ﬂow hypoth-
esis, it is generally assumed that managers pursue self interest at the
expense of shareholders. As such, the presence of cash ﬂow in excess
of that required to ﬁnance new value investments creates the potential
for those funds to bewasted (Richardson, 2006). There is evidence in the
compensation literature thatmanagerial compensation incentives affect
corporate policy by aligning the managers' interests with those of the
shareholders (Brockman et al., 2010; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2006;
Guay, 1999; Knopf, Nam, & Thorton, 2002). The implication is that the
compensation incentives reduce agency costs. This compensation litera-
ture has used one form or another of three variables to capturemanage-
rial compensation incentives: delta, vega, and cash compensation.1 The delta of outright share ownership is 1 and the vega is 0. The delta and vega of cash
are both equal to 0. The delta and vega ofmanagerial total ﬁrmbasedwealth areweighted
averages of the deltas and vegas of the individual shareholdings and options: delta ¼
∑
i
xideltai vega ¼∑
i
xivegai, where i refers to the individual shareholdings and options
and xi is the proportion of asset i in total ﬁrm based wealth. For example, consider a man-
ager with 50% of his wealth in shares and 50% in an option with a delta of 0.5. The delta of
his portfolio will be equal to 0.5 × 1 + 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.75.2.1. Delta and agency costs
Coles et al. (2006) highlight that delta may serve to align the inter-
ests of shareholders and managers by providing management with
incentives to work harder or more effectively in order to share gains/
losses with shareholders. Therefore, a negative relationship would be
expected between delta and agency costs. Alternatively, Chava and
Purnanandam (2010) argue that the incentive to share gains with
shareholders imposes a cost on management. This cost is inherent in
the form of increased exposure to the ﬁrm's total risk, which would be
of concern to an undiversiﬁed risk-averse manager, as a manager's
wealth is typically concentrated in the ﬁrm. Furthermore, managerial
human capital is closely associated with ﬁrm performance (Chava &
Purnanandam, 2010; Fama, 1980; Stulz and Smith, 1985). Therefore,
managers with higher delta exposure would be expected to favour
low risk corporate policies and disregard risky positive net present
value projects, thus leading to acute agency problems.
Belghitar andClark (2014) have shown that the relationship between
delta and risk taking depends on whether the CEO's utility function has
increasing, decreasing, or constant absolute risk aversion.2 A negative re-
lationship implies decreasing absolute risk aversion. Thus, for managers
with decreasing absolute risk aversion delta is negatively related to
investment related agency costs. Similarly for managers with increasing
absolute risk aversion delta is positively related to investment related
agency costs and there is no delta effect formanagerswith constant abso-
lute risk aversion. Most studies either implicitly or explicitly assume
decreasing absolute risk aversion, which leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative relationship between delta and invest-
ment related agency costs.2 Risk aversion means that each manager has a utility function u(w) satisfying the
following conditions:
u′(w)≥ 0, u″(w)≤ 0, ∀w, where primes denote ﬁrst and second derivativeswith respect to
wealth, denotedasw. Utility functions such as these are strictly concave. Pratt (1964) showed
that maximizing the expected utility of a risk averse economic agent is approximately equal
to: A ¼− u″ wð Þu0 wð Þ. DARA implies dAdw b0; IARA implies dAdw N0; and CARA implies dAdw ¼ 0.
4 The sample periodwas dictated by the availability of homogenous data. The period of
analysis is free of potential distortions caused by the exceptional measures taken in the
wake of the worldwide ﬁnancial crisis of 2007. The period of analysis is also free of poten-
tial distortions in reaction to the major tax reform of July 1997. Bell and Jenkinson (2002)
report that the effects of the tax reformonequity prices continued until the end of 1999, so
2000 is the ﬁrst year free of the reform's effects. 2000 is also the ﬁrst year that Boardex re-
ports estimations of CEO vega and delta. The passage of FAS 123R on December 12, 2004
caused Boardex to modify its database for the post-2004 period. Up to 2005 Boardex re-
ports compensation data using the old format (pre-FAS 123R) that uses the Black-
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max
FCF 1942 0.055 0.127 0.069 0.004 0.401
MKTBV 1894 2.071 2.612 1.447 0.421 41.053
Q_Ratio 1942 1.683 2.585 1.081 0.000 40.840
MCAP 1894 1.493 2.637 0.873 0 42.650
CEO Delta 1541 94.289 400.952 22 0 12,881
CEO Vega 1397 23.063 160.242 1.253 0 2481.039
CEO Cah 1504 344.414 200.650 300 5.423 1678.396
Audit fees 1823 6.378 1.455 6.217 1.792 14.293
Bsize 1851 2.084 0.311 2.079 0.693 3.091
Bindep 1851 0.437 0.159 0.429 0 0.875
LEV 1851 0.331 0.327 0.217 0.000 1.000
Fsize 1851 12.897 1.827 12.736 5.971 18.961
DIV 1851 0.026 0.032 0.020 0 0.693
FCF is measured as the operating income before depreciation minus the sum of taxes, in-
terest expenses and dividends paid, standardized by total assets.MKTB is the ratio of book
value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the
book value of total assets. QRATIO is the ratio ofmarket capitalization plus total debt divid-
ed by total assets.MCAP is the ratio ofmarket capitalization to total assets. CEODelta is the
pound change in CEO ﬁrm based wealth for a 1% change in stock price, in thousands. CEO
Vega is the pound change in the CEO's option basedwealth for a 1% change in stock return
standard deviation, in thousands. CEO Cash is measured as the sum of all cash based com-
pensation received by the CEO during the year. Audit Fees is the natural logarithm of audit
fees for the ﬁscal year. Bsize is the natural logarithmof total directors on the board. Bindep
is the ratio of total independent directors on the board to total directors on the board. LEV
is the ratio of short-termdebt total debt. Fsize is the natural logarithmof total assets. DIV is
the ratio of total cash dividends paid to total assets. All variables have been winsorized at
the 1st and 99th percentile.
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Belghitar and Clark (2014) have shown that, like delta, the effect of
vega on managerial behavior depends on whether themanager has de-
creasing, increasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The reason for
this is that vega is positive (see for example, Hull, 2003).3 Thus, an in-
crease in the volatility of the ﬁrm's returns increases the manager's
ﬁrm based wealth. The higher the vega, the larger is the increase in
wealth. An increase in wealth affects risk aversion depending on
whether the manager has decreasing, increasing or constant abso-
lute risk aversion (see footnote 2). Thus, under the plausible assump-
tion that managers have DARA utility functions, higher levels of vega
should increase the incentive of managers to reduce agency costs.
Previous studies (Beladi & Quijano, 2013; Brockman et al., 2010;
Chava & Purnanandam, 2010; Coles et al., 2006; Guay, 1999; Knopf
et al., 2002) have found that managerial compensation sensitivity
to stock return volatility does, encourage risk taking behaviour by
aligning the risk tolerance of shareholders and management. For
example, Coles et al. (2006) show that managers with higher values
of vega take riskier investment decisions. In a similar vein, Beladi and
Quijano (2013) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with CEOs that have higher values of
vega pay higher loan rates. The implication is that greatermanagerial
incentives to engage in value maximizing risky corporate policies
serve to reduce the costs of monitoring managerial behaviour. As
such, a negative relationship should exist between vega and agency
costs.
Hypothesis 2. There is a negative relationship between vega and invest-
ment related agency costs.Scholes option pricer to calculate the value of stock option grants. For ﬁscal years 2005
and later, Boardex reports compensation using the new format (post-FAS 123R). In the
post-FAS 123R period, ﬁrms calculate and expense equity-based compensation at fair val-
ue using their own valuation models. Thus, for the post-2004 data, Boardex does not cal-
culate the Black–Scholes value of current year stock option grants, nor do they provide
estimates of CEO vega and delta. Instead, Boardex reports the ﬁrm's own calculated fair
values of equity-based compensation, which is not comparable across ﬁrms within the2.3. Direct cash compensation and agency costs
Unlike delta and vega, managerial direct cash compensation bears
no direct sensitivity to ﬁrm performance or ﬁrm risk. In this respect3 Vega is the ﬁrst partial derivative of the value of the option with respect to the volatil-
ity of the return on underlying asset. Because of the asymmetric payoff structure of an op-
tion, vega is always positive. In the absence of the asymmetric payoff structure, vega is
equal to zero.Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) suggest that a higher level of mana-
gerial cash compensation is indicative of managerial entrenchment.
An entrenched, risk-averse manager could engage in policies that
serve his interests at the expense of shareholders. Furthermore, the
absence of convexity in cash compensation would not hinder the
manager's pursuit of conservative corporate policies. On the other
hand, Guay (1999) and Belkhir and Boubaker (2013) argue that greater
direct cash compensation affords managers the opportunity to diversify
their wealth outside the ﬁrm. By being more diversiﬁed, they are more
inclined to engage in riskier corporate policies, which would reduce the
monitoring costs of ensuring that managerial actions are congruent
with shareholder interests. As such, a negative relationship between
direct cash compensation and agency costs could also exist.
Hypothesis 3a. There is a positive relationship between cash compensa-
tion and investment related agency costs.
Hypothesis 3b. There is a negative relationship between cash compensa-
tion and investment related agency costs.3. Data and sample construction
The data on CEO compensation and ﬁrm based wealth incentives
and characteristics was hand-collected from BoardEx, while data on
ﬁrm ﬁnancial characteristics is from Thomson Reuters Worldscope.
We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms from the empirical analysis because the dif-
ferentiation between investment and ﬁnance operations is ambiguous.
The sample spans the period 2000–2004.4 For convenience, variable
deﬁnitions and sources of data are presented in Table 1.
3.1. Main variables: agency costs, executive delta, executive vega and
executive salary
We follow Doukas et al. (2005) and McKnight and Weir (2009) to
capture agency costs as the interaction of ﬁrm growth opportunities
and free cash ﬂow (FCF). Based on Jensen (1986), agency costs are
more pronounced among ﬁrmswith low growth opportunities, relative
to ﬁrms with high growth opportunities.5 To measure a ﬁrm's growth
opportunities we employ three measures; themarket-to-book ratio de-
ﬁned as the market value of assets less the book value of assets to total
assets; the q-ratio deﬁned as the ratio of market value of equity plus
total debt to total assets; and the market capitalization ratio deﬁned as
the ratio of market capitalization to total assets. Using these measures
of growth opportunities, we create interactive variables. The interactive
variable is equal to FCFmultiplied by a dummyvariable that equals 1 if a
ﬁrm's growth opportunity is less than the median of the sample and 0
otherwise. We deﬁne FCF as operating income before depreciationsame year if ﬁrms are using different valuation methods. Additionally, for the same ﬁrm,
CEO vega and delta are not comparable pre- and post-FAS 123R.
5 A number of studies have provided support to Jensen's arguments that agency costs
occur mainly in ﬁrms with high FCF and low investment opportunities (see among others
Grifﬁn et al., 2010).
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
1.FCF_MKTBV 1
2.FCF_QRATIO 0.901 1
3.FCF_MCP 0.856 0.881 1
4.CEO Delta −0.118 −0.107 −0.118 1
5.CEO Vega −0.085 −0.076 −0.077 0.274 1
6.CEO Cash −0.024 −0.015 0.016 0.201 0.379 1
7.Audit Fees 0.118 0.120 0.153 0.081 0.246 0.679 1
8.Bsize 0.037 0.040 0.070 0.114 0.211 0.566 0.569 1
9.Bindep 0.003 0.006 0.031 0.038 0.102 0.294 0.304 0.072 1
10.LEV −0.107 −0.077 −0.122 0.042 −0.025 −0.086 −0.104 −0.092 −0.103 1
11.Fsize 0.212 0.202 0.243 0.118 0.248 0.762 0.812 0.672 0.267 −0.157 1
12.DIV 0.083 0.082 −0.039 0.094 0.104 0.131 0.089 0.048 0.086 0.059 0.077 1.
Values in bold are signiﬁcant at the 5% level and above. FCF_MKTB is measured as the interaction variable between free cash ﬂow to total assets and market-to-book-ratio. FCF_QRATIO is
measured as the interaction variable between free cash ﬂow to total assets and Q-ratio. FCF_MCAP is measured as interaction variable between free cash ﬂow to total assets and market
capitalization ratio. CEODelta is the pound change in CEOﬁrmbasedwealth for a 1% change in stock price, in thousands. CEOVega is the pound change in the CEO's option basedwealth for
a 1% change in stock return standarddeviation, in thousands. CEO Cash ismeasured as the sumof all cash based compensation received by the CEOduring the year. Audit Fees is the natural
logarithm of audit fees for the ﬁscal year. Bsize is the natural logarithm of total directors on the board. Bindep is the ratio of total independent directors on the board to total directors
on the board. LEV is the ratio of short-term debt total debt. Fsize is the natural logarithm of total assets. DIV is the ratio of total cash dividends paid to total assets.
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ized by total assets. This measure is consistent with the measure
adopted by Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Doukas et al. (2005) and
McKnight and Weir (2009).
The measures of executive compensation sensitivities are also con-
sistent with prior studies (Coles et al., 2006; Guay, 1999; Knopf et al.,
2002). CEO Delta (Vega) is deﬁned as the pound change in the CEO's
personal ﬁrm based wealth with respect to a 1% change in the stock
price (stock volatility). CEO ﬁrm based wealth is measured as the
value of all stock ownership, unexpired stock options and long term in-
centive plans (LTIPs) accumulated and held by the CEO to date. 6 Finally,
CEO Cash is captured from the annual direct cash compensation paid to
the CEO in the ﬁscal year. All compensation structures are measured in
the thousands of pounds. Additional data collected from BoardEx
includes the total number and the number of independent directors
on the board.
3.2. Control variables
Based on prior studies on agency costs, several control variables are
included in the analysis. Audit Fees ismeasured as the natural logarithm
of total audit fees for the ﬁscal year (see Grifﬁn, Lont, & Sun, 2010).
Board size (Bsize) is measured as the natural logarithm of the total di-
rectors on the board. The ratio of independent directors on the board
to total members on the board (Bindep) is employed as a proxy for
board independence (McKnight & Weir, 2009). The natural logarithm
of total assets proxies for ﬁrm size (Fsize). We also include a measure
of leverage computed as the ratio of total debts to total assets (LEV).
Dividend (DIV) is deﬁned as the ratio of total cash dividends paid to
total assets. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
current study are presented in Table 2.
CEO Delta has amean (median) of £94,289 (£22,000). Likewise, CEO
Vega has a mean (median) of £23,060 thousand (£1,250). This ﬁnding
suggests that the average (median) CEO ﬁrm based wealth increases
by £94,289 (£22,000) for a 1 percent increase in the ﬁrm stock price.
Similarly, the average (median) CEO ﬁrm based wealth increases by
£23,060 (£1,250) for a 1 percent increase in the ﬁrm stock volatility.
The sensitivities of UK CEO ﬁrm based wealth are lower than the ones6 Thedelta of outright share ownership is 1 and the vega is 0. Thedelta and vegaofman-
agerial total ﬁrm based wealth are weighted averages of the deltas and vegas of the indi-
vidual shareholdings and options:delta ¼∑
i
xideltai vega ¼∑
i
xivegai, where i refers to
the individual shareholdings and options and xi is the proportion of asset i in total ﬁrm
based wealth. For example, consider a manager with 50% of his wealth in shares and
50% in an option with a delta of 0.5. The delta of his portfolio will be equal to
0.5 × 1 + 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.75.reported inUS studies. For example Chava andPurnanandam(2010) re-
port an average CEO Delta (Vega) of $607,000 ($79,000). Table 2 also
shows that UK CEOs receive on average (median) an annual cash com-
pensation of £344,414 (£300,000). Table 3 presents the pairwise corre-
lation matrix of all variables to be included in the current study. The
high correlation across the different agency costs measures suggests
that they serve as good proxies for each other and by extension for in-
vestment related agency costs.
4. Empirical results
Table 4 reports the results for six speciﬁcationswhere thedependent
variable is a measure of agency costs and the independent variables are
the CEO compensation incentives and the control variables described
above. As stated earlier, the agency costs are more prone to ﬁrms with
free cash ﬂow and low ﬁrm growth opportunities. Tomeasure the agen-
cy costs, we use an interaction variable bymultiplying the ﬁrm free cash
ﬂowwith an indicator (dummy) variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm's growth
opportunity is less than the median of the sample and 0 otherwise. All
the independent variables are lagged by oneperiod to reduce the poten-
tial of endogeneity bias. Since themeasures of agency costs distribution
are left truncated at zero, we employ truncated regressions. To control
for industry and time heterogeneity, we include industry and year
dummies in the regressions. Models (1), (3) and (5) in our analysis
only incorporate corporate governance monitoring mechanisms and
ﬁrm characteristics to provide comparisons with earlier studies. Alter-
natively, models (2), (4) and (6) include the compensation variables.
The coefﬁcient ofAudit Fees is signiﬁcantly negative across allmodels
presented in Table 4. This ﬁnding is consistent with Grifﬁn et al. (2010)
who argue that in low growth ﬁrms with free cash ﬂow, managers may
have an incentive to hidewasteful corporate actions throughmanipula-
tion of ﬁnancial statements. In this regard, Chung, Firth, and Kim (2005)
show that this increases audit risk and effort expended by auditors to
minimize the likelihood of managerial misrepresentation of ﬁnancial
results and involves higher audit fees. Therefore, higher audit fees
serve to reduce FCF in ﬁrms with low or poor growth opportunities,
and, by extension, reduce agency costs. Similar to Audit Fees, a signiﬁ-
cant negative relationship between Bsize and agency costs is reported
across models (1) and (3). This is consistent with the notion that larger
boards serve to strengthen the link between corporations and their
environments, provide counsel and advice regarding strategic options
for theﬁrm and play a crucial role in creating a corporate identity,whilst
also serving as a monitoring mechanism, thereby making larger boards
more effective in reducing agency costs (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, &
Ellstrand, 1999). LEV is negatively signiﬁcant only in model (2). This
provides some evidence that debts serve as a potent mechanism to
8 We excluded ﬁrms with ﬁrm size values between the 40th and 60th percentiles be-
cause these ﬁrms cannot be easily classiﬁed as either being large or small.
Table 4
Agency costs regressed against executive compensation sensitivities, corporate governance mechanisms and ﬁrm characteristics.
FCF_MKTB FCF_QRATIO FCF_MCAP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Delta −0.064* −0.063* −0.064*
(0.080) (0.079) (0.076)
CEO Vega 0.046 −0.001 0.021
(0.741) (0.993) (0.879)
Log (CEO cash) −0.057** −0.440** −0.031*
(0.001) (0.007) (0.062)
Audit fees −0.007** −0.005** −0.010** −0.010** −0.012** −0.010**
(0.000) (0.016) (0.002) (0.019) (0.001) (0.017)
Bsize −0.016** −0.013 −0.016** −0.008 −0.013 −0.017
(0.028) (0.216) (0.027) (0.440) (0.112) (0.116)
Bindep 0.007 −0.002 0.018* 0.021 0.004 0.009
(0.466) (0.870) (0.083) (0.176) (0.714) (0.570)
LEV −0.007 −0.013** −0.003 −0.003 0.002 −0.007
(0.128) (0.018) (0.490) (0.632) (0.772) (0.298)
Fsize 0.008** 0.014** 0.012** 0.017** 0.013** 0.015**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
DIV −0.106** −0.044 −0.086* −0.030 0.019 0.007
(0.019) (0.322) (0.052) (0.517) (0.677) (0.875)
Constant −0.030* −0.083** −0.060** −0.122** −0.051 −0.065*
(0.077) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.112) (0.058)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1389 986 1389 986 1389 986
R2 12.31% 19.95% 10.21% 16.67% 12.31% 17.22%
Agency costs are the dependent variables, and they are measured at time t. All independent variables are measured at time t− 1. FCF_MKTB is dependent variable in models (1) and
(2) and is measured as the interaction variable between the free cash ﬂow to total assets and market-to-book-ratio. FCF_QRATIO is the dependent variable for models (3) and (4) and
is measured as the interaction variable between the free cash ﬂow to total assets and Q-ratio. FCF_MCAP is the dependent variable in models (5) and (6) and is measured as interaction
variable between the free cash ﬂow to total assets andmarket capitalization ratio. For empirical deﬁnition of the independent variables see Table 1. 4-digit industry classiﬁcations are included
in the regression The models are estimated with the tobit estimator and p-values are in parentheses and are robust to heteroscedasticity. * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05.
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documented as having a highly signiﬁcant positive relationship with
agency costs at the 1% level across all models in Table 4. This ﬁnding is
consistent with larger ﬁrms being more complex and more difﬁcult to
monitor, thereby providing managers with greater opportunities to
pursue selﬁnterest (Doukas et al., 2005; McKnight & Weir, 2009).
Ourmainmodels (2), (4) and (6) provide signiﬁcant evidence of the
impact of managerial compensation incentives on agency costs. In
models (2), (4) and (6) there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship
level between CEO Delta and agency costs. This ﬁnding is consistent
with Hypothesis 1 and the argument that the sensitivity of managerial
wealth to changes in stock price (delta) serves to align the interests
of managers with those of shareholders. Besides delta, models (2),
(4) and (6) present evidence of a signiﬁcant, negative relationship be-
tween CEO Cash and agency costs. This is consistent with the argument
that higher levels of direct cash compensation afford the undiversiﬁed
manager greater opportunity to diversify his personal wealth outside
the ﬁrm (Belkhir & Boubaker, 2013; Guay, 1999). There is no evidence
that sensitivity of managerial ﬁrm based wealth to stock return volatil-
ity (CEO Vega) has any signiﬁcant effect on agency costs.7
4.1. Firm size, managerial compensation sensitivities and agency costs
Aswith other governancemechanisms, the effectiveness ofmanage-
rial risk incentives may vary across ﬁrm size (Hutchinson & Gul, 2004).
According to McKnight andWeir (2009) large ﬁrms tend to be complex
and difﬁcult to monitor compared to small ﬁrms. As such, managers of
large ﬁrms are more prone to pursue self interest corporate policies be-
cause their actions are not easily observable. In such situations compen-
sation based incentives could be very effective to curb self-interested
managers. On the other hand, the actions of managers in small ﬁrms
are easily observable, but the agency conﬂict is exacerbated by the
ﬁnancial vulnerability of small ﬁrms due to their limited access to7 As a robustness test we added themanagerial ownership percentage to our speciﬁca-
tion, the results remain qualitatively similar to results reported in Table 4.human and ﬁnancial resources (Titman &Wessels, 1988). This suggests
that larger ﬁrms are conducive to covering managerial actions and
smaller ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially fragile, the effect of compensation
incentives may vary across the large-small environment.
To assess the impact of managerial compensation incentives on
agency costs in differing organizational environments due to size, we
split the sample into 3 size categories. Firms with Fsize less (greater)
than the 40th (60th) percentile of the sample are classiﬁed as small
(large) ﬁrms.8 As in Table 4, the dependent variable is measured as
the interaction between ﬁrm free [change with] and dummy cash ﬂow
and ﬁrm growth opportunity. The regression results are presented in
Table 5. 9
In all models in Table 5 there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship
between CEO Delta and agency costs at the conventional level of signif-
icance. This is consistent with the results presented in Table 3 and
suggests that irrespective of ﬁrm size, larger managerial wealth delta
serves to reduce agency costs. There is also some evidence that CEO
Vega has a negative effect on agency costs for small ﬁrms in models
(2), (4) and (6) but not for large ﬁrms. The difference between smaller
and larger ﬁrms could be due to more risk enhancing opportunities for
smaller ﬁrms associated with their inherently higher riskiness docu-
mented by Titman andWessels (1988). Finally, there is a highly signif-
icant, negative relationship between direct cash compensation (CEO
Cash) and agency costs at the 1% level in large ﬁrms (models (1),
(5) and (11)) but not in small ﬁrms. This effect is possibly due to the
fact that salaries in the larger ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly higher than those
in the smaller ﬁrms, thereby providing the opportunity for managers
in the larger ﬁrms to more effectively diversify their wealth portfolios.
Interestingly, the results in Table 5 suggest that monitoring mecha-
nisms are effective tools for reducing agency costs in large ﬁrms but9 As a robustness test, we also consider non-interacted high FCF as the dependent var-
iable. The results, available on request, are qualitatively similar to those for the interacted
dependent variables.
Table 5
Agency costs regressed against executive compensation sensitivities, corporate governance mechanisms and ﬁrm characteristics based on ﬁrm size.
FCF_MKTBV χ2 (1) FCF_QRATIO χ2 (1) FCF_MCAP χ2 (1)
L. Firms (1) S. Firms (2) L. Firms (3) S. Firms (4) L. Firms (5) S. Firms (6)
CEO Delta −0.040** −0.200* 4.99*** −0.040** −0.200* 4.31** −0.040** −0.200* 5.14***
(0.014) (0.078) (0.029) (0.080) (0.028) (0.067)
CEO Vega −0.031 −0.502* 2.95* 0.130 −0.510* 2.07 0.094 −0.567** 3.11*
(0.830) (0.088) (0.365) (0.090) (0.955) (0.042)
Log(CEO Cash) −0.012*** −0.090 6.20*** −0.010*** −0.041 4.01** −0.010*** −0.0521 5.34***
(0.001) (0.270) (0.001) (0.625) (0.001) (0.641)
Audit Fees −0.009*** 0.006 −0.007** −0.002 −0.004 −0.018
(0.003) (0.935) (0.019) (0.767) (0.224) (0.210)
Bsize −0.035** −0.028 −0.009 −0.033 −0.024 −0.015
(0.028) (0.267) (0.574) (0.190) (0.171) (0.557)
Bindep −0.064** 0.022 −0.041 0.039 −0.027 0.054
(0.019) (0.517) (0.134) (0.245) (0.370) (0.105)
LEV −0.057*** −0.006 −0.036*** 0.001 −0.045*** 0.009
(0.000) (0.623) (0.003) (0.902) (0.000) (0.535)
Fsize 0.0243*** 0.026*** 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.041***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
DIV −0.201** 0.033 −0.223* 0.054 −0.135 0.036
(0.046) (0.681) (0.053) (0.515) (0.153) (0.647)
Constant 0.063** 0.008 0.026 −0.121** −0.220** −0.113
(0.028) (0.775) (0.459) (0.020) (0.009) (0.171)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 475 307 475 307 475 307
R2 26.37% 23.79% 18.91% 22.04% 17.57% 21.07%
Agency costs are thedependent variable, and they aremeasured at time t. All independent variables aremeasured at time t− 1. FCF_MKTB is dependent variable inmodels (1) and (2) and
ismeasured as the interaction variable between the free cash ﬂow to total assets andmarket-to-book-ratio. FCF_QRATIO is the dependent variable formodels (3) and (4) and ismeasured
as the interaction variable between the free cash ﬂow to total assets and Q-ratio. FCF_MCAP is the dependent variable in models (5) and (6) and is measured as interaction variable be-
tween the free cash ﬂow to total assets andmarket capitalization ratio. For empirical deﬁnition of the independent variables see Table 1Models (1), (3), (5) are regressions on a subsample
of large ﬁrms, while models (2), (4) and (6) are regressions on a subsample of small ﬁrms. 4-digit industry classiﬁcations are included in the regression. χ2 (1) is the test of difference
between the coefﬁcient of large sample and small sample. The results are based on Tobit estimator. P-values are presented in parenthesis and are robust to heteroscedasticity.
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% levels of signiﬁcance respectively.
196 Y. Belghitar, E. Clark / International Review of Financial Analysis 38 (2015) 191–197not in the smaller ones. In models (1) and (3) a signiﬁcant negative
relationship is presented between Audit Fees and agency costs at the
1% and 5% levels respectively. In all other models the relationship is in-
signiﬁcant. In model (1) Bsize has a signiﬁcant, negative relationship
with agency costs at the 5% level, while in all other regressions the
coefﬁcient of Bsize is insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, in model (1) there is a
negative relationship between Bindep and agency costs at the 5% level
of signiﬁcance, while in all other regressions the coefﬁcient is insigniﬁ-
cant. LEV has a signiﬁcant, negative relationshipwith agency costs at the
1% level for large ﬁrms. Overall, the evidence suggests that insofar as
managerial actions are more easily observable in smaller ﬁrms, moni-
toringmechanisms are rendered ineffective as shareholders can directly
monitor managers themselves. Compensation incentives, however,
reﬂected in delta and vega, are more effective in reducing agency costs
in the smaller ﬁrms. Both delta and vega are signiﬁcant for the smaller
ﬁrms and the absolute values of their coefﬁcients are much larger
than the corresponding coefﬁcients for the larger ﬁrms.
5. Conclusion
This study establishes the ﬁrst empirical link between managerial
compensation and investment related agency costs. The results show
that managerial compensation incentives do have a signiﬁcant effect
on agency costs. Delta has a signiﬁcant, negative effect on agency costs
for ﬁrms both large and small. However, the larger absolute values of
the delta coefﬁcients for small ﬁrms suggest that delta incentives are
more effective in reducing agency costs in the small ﬁrm environment.
The signiﬁcance of vega in reducing agency costs is concentrated in
small ﬁrms. This ﬁnding suggests that vega exposure is more effective
in the small ﬁrm environment with more risk enhancing opportunities.
The signiﬁcance of cash compensation in reducing agency costs is con-
centrated in the large ﬁrms. The implication here is that higher cash
compensation reduces agency costs by affording risk-averse managers
the opportunity to diversify outside the ﬁrm.There is also some evidence that monitoringmechanisms, such as ex-
ternal auditors, board size and board composition, are effective in reduc-
ing agency costs in large ﬁrms but not in small ones. This suggests that if
larger ﬁrms create an environment where managerial actions are less
observable, monitoring mechanisms such as board of directors, external
auditors and debt represent an effective means of reducing agency
costs. Furthermore, the insigniﬁcance of monitoring mechanisms in re-
ducing agency costs in smallﬁrms is evidence for the argument thatman-
agerial actions are more observable in these ﬁrms and, consequently,
monitoring mechanisms are a costly and inefﬁcient mechanism for
reducing agency costs.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by ESRC Grant Number RES-000-22-
607 3701. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful com-
ments. Naturally, we are solely responsible for the interpretation of
the data and any errors.
References
Beladi, H., & Quijano, M. (2013). CEO incentives for risk shifting and its effect on corporate
bank loan cost. International Review of Financial Analysis, 30, 182–188.
Belghitar, Y., & Clark, E. (2014). Convexity, magniﬁcation and translation: The effect of
managerial option based compensation on corporate cash holdings. Journal of
Financial Research, 37, 191–210.
Belkhir, M., & Boubaker, S. (2013). CEO inside debt and hedging decisions: Lessons from
the U.S. banking industry. Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions and
Money, 24, 23–246.
Bell, L., & Jenkinson, T. (2002). New Evidence of the impact of dividend taxation and on
the identity of the marginal investor. Journal of Finance, 57, 1321–1345.
Berger, P., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. (1997). Managerial entrenchment and capital structure
decisions. The Journal of Finance, 52, 1411–1438.
Brockman, P., Martin, X., & Unlu, E. (2010). Executive compensation and the maturity
structure of corporate debt. The Journal of Finance, 67, 1123–1161.
Chava, S., & Purnanandam, A. (2010). CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies.
Journal of Financial Economics, 97, 263–278.
197Y. Belghitar, E. Clark / International Review of Financial Analysis 38 (2015) 191–197Chung, R., Firth, M., & Kim, K. (2005). Earnings management, surplus free cash ﬂow, and
external monitoring. Journal of Business Research, 58, 766–776.
Coles, J., Daniel, N., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of
Financial Economics, 79, 431–468.
Conyon, M. R., Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2011). Are US CEOs paid more than UK CEOs?
Inferences from risk-adjusted pay. Review of Financial Studies, 24, 402–408.
Dalton, D., Daily, C., Johnson, J., & Ellstrand, A. (1999). Number of directors and ﬁnancial
performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 674–686.
Doukas, J., McKnight, P., & Pantzalis, C. (2005). Security analysis, agency costs, and UK
ﬁrm characteristics. International Review of Financial Analysis, 14, 493–507.
Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of ﬁrm. Journal of Political Economy, 88,
228–307.
Goergen, M., & Renneboog, L. (2001). Strongmanagers and passive institutional investors
in the UK. InM. Becht, & F. Barca (Eds.), The control of corporate Europe (pp. 259–284).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grifﬁn, P., Lont, D., & Sun, Y. (2010). Agency problems and audit fees: Further tests of the
free cash ﬂow hypothesis. Accounting & Finance, 50, 321–350.
Guay, W. (1999). The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: An analysis of the magni-
tude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 43–71.
Hall, B. J., & Murphy, K. J. (2002). Stock options for undiversiﬁed executives. Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 33, 3–42.
Hull, J. (2003). Options, futures and other derivatives. New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.
Hutchinson, M., & Gul, F. (2004). Investment opportunity set, corporate governance
practices and ﬁrm performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10, 595–614.Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash ﬂow, corporate ﬁnance and takeovers.
American Economic Review, 76, 323–329.
Jensen, M., &Meckling,W. (1976). Theory of the ﬁrm:Managerial behaviour, agency costs
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.
Knopf, J., Nam, J., & Thorton, J., Jr. (2002). The volatility and price sensitivities of manage-
rial stock option portfolios and corporate hedging. The Journal of Finance, 57, 801–814.
Lehn, K., & Poulsen, A. (1989). Free cash ﬂow and stock holder gains in going private
transactions. The Journal of Finance, 44, 771–789.
McKnight, P., & Weir, C. (2009). Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and
ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis.
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 139–158.
Murphy, K. (1999). Executive compensation. In O. Ashenfelter, & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook
of LaborEconomics, Vol. 3b. (pp. 2485–2563). North Holland: Elsevier Science
(Chapter 38).
Pratt, J. (1964). Risk aversion in the large and in the small. Econometrica, 32, 122–136.
Richardson, S. (2006). Over-investment of free cash ﬂow. Review of Accounting Studies, 11,
159–189.
Stulz, R., & Smith, C. (1985). Thedeterminants of ﬁrms' hedging policies. Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 28, 397–405.
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. The Journal
of Finance, 43, 1–19.
